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Abstract Deep brain stimulation (DBS) is a well-
accepted treatment for movement disorders and is
currently explored as a treatment option for various
neurological and psychiatric disorders. Several case
studies suggest that DBS may, in some patients,
influence mental states critical to personality to such
an extent that it affects an individual’s personal identity,
i.e. the experience of psychological continuity, of
persisting through time as the same person. Without
questioning the usefulness of DBS as a treatment option
for various serious and treatment refractory conditions,
the potential of disruptions of psychological continuity
raises a number of ethical and legal questions. An
important question is that of legal responsibility if DBS
induced changes in a patient’s personality result in
damage caused by undesirable or even deviant behavior.
Disruptions in psychological continuity can in some
cases also have an effect on an individual’s mental
competence. This capacity is necessary in order to
obtain informed consent to start, continue or stop
treatment, and it is therefore not only important from
an ethical point of view but also has legal consequences.
Taking the existing literature and the Dutch legal system
as a starting point, the present paper discusses the
implications of DBS induced disruptions in psycho-
logical continuity for a patient’s responsibility for
action and competence of decision and raises a
number of questions that need further research.
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Introduction
Deep brain stimulation (DBS) is a well-accepted
treatment for movement disorders, including Parkin-
son’s disease (PD), Dystonia and Essential Tremor if
symptoms are medically intractable and/or medical
treatment has serious side effects. The application of
DBS in patients with movement disorders was found
to result in considerable alleviation of motor symp-
toms and reduced medication needs [1–5]. The
finding that DBS affects neural activity in brain areas
involved in cognitive and affective functions led to
the extended use of DBS from motor disorders to
psychiatric disorders including depression [6, 7] and
obsessive-compulsive disorder [8–10]. Given the
successfulness of the treatment and the continuing
advancement of the technology, it seems likely that
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DBS will be expanded to other psychiatric popula-
tions. The finding that DBS has several positive
effects, for instance memory enhancement [11],
alleviation of alcohol dependency [12] and reduction
of aggressive behavior [13], gave furthermore reason
to the assumption that DBS may be effective in
treating other conditions, such as Alzheimer’s disease
and drug addiction. Moreover, it has been suggested
that DBS might be applicable within criminal justice
in order to treat offenders and eventually decrease
criminal behavior [14]. While especially the latter
idea is rather speculative at this point in time, DBS is
actually being explored as a treatment option for
various disorders including Alzheimer’s disease,
depression, anxiety disorders, and Tourette’s syn-
drome [6–10, 15, 16]. DBS is therefore currently
used in both therapeutic settings, i.e. as treatment for
movement disorders, and in experimental settings, i.e.
to test its effectiveness as treatment for various
neurological and psychiatric disorders.
Although DBS has important therapeutic effects
for otherwise treatment resistant conditions, there is
potential for serious complications, such as haemor-
rhage and infections, and unexpected side effects,
including cognitive and psychiatric symptoms. The
most common cognitive and psychiatric problems that
have been reported concern a decline in word fluency
and verbal memory [1, 17–19], depression [5, 20],
increased suicide tendency [20–22], anxiety [2],
emotional hyperreactivity [2] and hypomania [2, 23,
24]. Some of these side effects might also affect
aspects of the patient’s personality, i.e. his unique
character traits, as reflected by his thoughts, desires,
motivations and behavior (for a more detailed
discussion on personality see e.g. [25–27]). So far,
little is known about the impact of DBS on patients’
personality. Nevertheless, DBS induced changes in
personality have been observed in some cases [15,
24], while others have found no or little impact on
personality [2, 8, 28]. Alterations in mental states
critical to personality could affect an individual’s
personal identity, i.e. the experience of psychological
continuity, of persisting through time as the same
person [29]. Since there are various possible cognitive
and psychiatric side effects, and effects of DBS on
personality have been observed, it can be hypothe-
sized that disruptions in psychological continuity can
occur in patients undergoing DBS. So far however,
there has been no systematic empirical research on the
effect of DBS on an individual’s psychological
continuity and hence little is known about the
influence of DBS on an individual’s identity. The
possibility of DBS induced changes in an individual’s
personality and identity entails important ethical and
legal questions, for instance regarding responsibility
for action and mental competence.
Before discussing this topic in more detail, two
issues need to be mentioned. Firstly, the probability
for side effects to occur depends in part on the exact
site of stimulation [30]. In PD for instance, adverse
events (affecting the patients’ cognitive, psychiatric
and behavioral status) at 4-years postsurgery were
found to be higher in subthalamic nucleus stimulation
compared to stimulation of the globus pallidus
internus and the ventral intermediate part of the
thalamus [31]. Although we will be discussing the
issue of DBS and psychological continuity in general,
it is important to realize that DBS induced changes in
an individual’s personality and the consequences
thereof depend on the specific application of DBS.
The second issue concerns the difference between
experimental and therapeutic use of DBS. In experi-
mental settings, the possibility of adverse reactions
may be high. This is typically taken into account,
because the exact likelihood and extent of possible
side effects is unknown, or may even constitute one of
the explicit research targets of the study (see, e.g. 32).
In contrast, if DBS is used in therapeutic settings,
patients may expect that the risk of serious adverse
effects, such as personality changes, is small. Al-
though we will discuss the implications of DBS
induced personality changes in general, these impli-
cations seem to be particularly pressing within
therapeutic settings.
The potential of unwanted side effects—that may
or may not affect psychological continuity and
personal identity—does of course not diminish the
avail of DBS as a treatment option for various serious
and treatment refractory conditions. Instead, discus-
sing these adverse effects might contribute to realize
the full potential of DBS, for instance by emphasizing
the importance of excluding individuals with certain
preconditions or comorbidities from the pool of
qualified candidates for the treatment. In addition, it
allows for an exploration of the ethical and legal
implications of DBS induced disruptions of psycho-
logical continuity. In this paper, we will explore how
DBS induced alterations in the personal identity of the
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treated individual may affect his responsibility for
actions and decisions. It bears emphasis that it is not
our aim to argue that DBS will always, or even often,
lead to serious changes in personal identity. We will
suggest that DBS might (conceivably and at times in
practice) affect psychological processes to such an
extent that effects on personal identity cannot be
excluded. The aim of this paper is to explore the
consequences of DBS induced disruptions in psycho-
logical continuity for an individual’s responsibility for
action and competence of decision, taking into account
the difference between established therapeutic and
experimental settings. We take some of the case studies
described in the literature and the Dutch legal system as
a starting point to illustrate some of the most urgent
questions raised by DBS induced changes in the
personal identity of the treated individual.
Personal Identity, Responsibility for Action
and Mental Competence
The topic of personal identity is a rather complicated
one, and we cannot possibly do justice to its full history
and its many nuances in this paper. Instead, we will
focus on two practical issues that arise when examining
the impact of DBS on personal identity. Specifically,
these issues concern responsibility for action and mental
competence. From a legal perspective, it is essential to
address the question whether a patient who received
DBS and experienced a change in his personal identity
as a result of the treatment can be held responsible for
his actions. If a DBS patient causes some kind of
damage that he might not have caused if he had not
received the treatment, it is not intuitively clear that he is
to be held (completely) responsible for his actions. We
will also discuss the effect that alterations in an
individual’s personal identity might have on his mental
competence, i.e. the ability to remember, understand and
decide upon relevant information [32]. This capacity is
necessary in order to obtain informed consent to start,
continue or stop treatment, and it is therefore not only
important from an ethical point of view but also has
legal consequences.
The problem of personal identity over time has
been the subject of substantial philosophical debates
[e.g. 33–46]. Although several different theories exist,
we will focus here on what has been called ‘the
standard view’, i.e. those theories that find their basis
in psychological criteria of personal identity (PCPI).
This set of theories belongs to the oldest (Locke) and
still most influential [e.g. 37–39, 42–44, 46, see 33,
34, 36, 40, 41, 46] for criticisms and alternatives]
within philosophy and fits well with the legal
emphasis, as we will see below, on psychological
properties (e.g. rationality) of human beings.
John Locke is generally considered as the founding
father of PCPI. He advocated a psychological conti-
nuity criterion based on memory. Relevant to this paper
is Locke’s emphasis on the forensic, normative
implications of his analysis of a person. About the
concept of ‘person’ Locke (1694, II, xvii, 26) said: “It
is a forensic term, appropriating actions and their merit;
and so belongs only to intelligent agents, capable of a
law, and happiness, and misery. This personality
extends itself beyond present existence to what is past,
only by consciousness,—whereby it becomes
concerned and accountable; owns and imputes to itself
past actions, just upon the same ground and for the
same reason as it does the present.”
More formally, though still in a somewhat simplified
form, the PCPI holds that a person X at t1 is the same
person as Y at t2, if X is (uniquely) psychologically
continuous with Y. The psychological continuity con-
sists of overlapping chains of direct psychological
connections like memories, intentions, beliefs, goals,
desires, and similarity of character [38, 44]. It bears
emphasis that the focus on the continuity of psycho-
logical functions and properties allows for an oper-
ationalization by means of standard psychological
tests such as Tellegen’s Multidimensional Personality
Questionnaire (MPQ) [47], the Iowa Personality
Questionnaire (IPQ) [48], and tests for cognitive and
executive functioning (see e.g. the large test set used
by Witt et al. [49]).
Many philosophical debates have raged and con-
tinue to do so about the relative importance of the
concepts used in order to state the continuity, whether
it is better to speak of ‘connectedness’ instead of
‘continuity’ and on the issue of whether or not this
continuity should be unique (i.e. effectively singling
out one and only one person). Although for this
reason it is good to keep in mind that we are speaking
about a set or family of theories, we will take the
PCPI principle in its above, general formulation, as
the starting point for our analysis of the ethical and
legal questions raised by DBS with regard to
responsibility for actions and decisions.
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The central question thus becomes whether the use of
DBS does, or could under certain circumstances, affect
the psychological continuity standardly taken to be
characteristic of personal identity. That this is not idle
speculation becomes clear from a recent presentation of
a case illustrating that DBS can cause changes in
identity as defined by the PCPI principle. A 43-year-
old man suffering from Tourette’s Syndrome received
DBS, because the symptoms had a major impact on his
life and drug treatment was unsuccessful and had
evoked major side effects [15]. The target sites and
the stimulation procedure were considered both safe
and efficacious for the (partial) relief of his tics [15].
The DBS treatment was successful and the patient
learned to adjust the stimulation parameters himself so
he could better control his tics. However, 12 months
after the operation, the patient had developed a
dissociative response, i.e. an alternate identity state,
when the amplitude of the stimulation was increased.
This gave the physicians the opportunity to use this
case in an experimental setting to explore the neuro-
logical basis of dissociation. Increasing the amplitude
of stimulation resulted in the patient “anxiously
crouching in a corner, covering his face with his
hands. He spoke with a childish high-pitched voice and
repeatedly insisted that he was not to blame. Sentences
were brief and grammatically incorrect. If approached
by one of us, he fiercely kicked his feet because he
feared being thrown in the basement.” [15, p. 545].
When the amplitude of the stimulation was decreased,
the patient’s responses became adequate again and he
was unable to recall what exactly had happened,
although he could report to have been overwhelmed
by bad childhood memories [15]. This case demon-
strates that DBS can impinge on psychological
continuity (in this case by having profound effects on
behavior and memory) and influence an individual’s
personal identity to such an extent that an alternate
personality state can be observed.
This case suggests that DBS induced disruptions in
psychological continuity can occur relatively quickly,
since the patient’s behavior changed immediately
after the stimulation was increased and disappeared
immediately after the stimulation was decreased. It is
not entirely clear however whether the dissociative
response was the result of an increase of the
amplitude of the stimulation and thus would also
have occurred if stimulation had been increased
immediately after the surgery, or whether the disso-
ciative response occurred gradually and emerged
12 months after the implantation of the electrodes.
In general, sudden changes may be rare (though they
do occur, see e.g. 50). Rather, changes in an
individual’s personality may occur gradually over a
considerable period of time after the stimulation has
been turned on [23, 51]. This issue clearly requires
more systematic empirical research. The timescale
involved in DBS induced personality changes is
important for two reasons. Firstly, the effects of DBS
over longer periods of time might be less easily
reversible, due to adaptations within the brain to
prolonged stimulation.1 If it turns out to be true that
DBS is not as reversible as commonly assumed, this
could significantly increase the ethical concerns about
DBS induced personality changes discussed in this
paper. Secondly, the effects of DBS over longer
timescales might be difficult to assess independently
of the continuing changes (e.g. progressive neuronal
degeneration) taking place within the patient, as DBS is
a non-curative therapy. This may make an assessment
of the ethical implications of DBS less straightforward.
These issues concerning the timescales involved in
DBS induced changes in an individual’s personality are
in need of further investigation. For the purpose of our
paper, the primary concern are the consequences of
DBS induced personality alterations rather than the
timescales along which DBS might affect personality.
Since the above cited case demonstrates the possibil-
ity of DBS induced disruptions in psychological conti-
nuity—regardless of whether these occur immediately or
several months after the treatment—it seems necessary to
not only empirically explore the factors involved in these
disruptions, but also to address the ethical and legal
implications thereof. In the following sections, we will
illustrate the effects that DBS induced disruptions in
psychological continuity may have for an individual’s
responsibility for action and mental competence in more
detail and raise questions that need further research.
Psychological Continuity and Responsibility
for Action
According to Morse, the legal concepts of personhood
and responsibility are practically oriented [52]. Per-
1 We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for this and
several other insightful suggestions.
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sons are treated as potentially rational intentional
agents, whose actions are governed by reason. Law is
a system of rules that is meant to guide or influence
behavior, by providing a person with reasons for
forbearance or action, as premises in practical syllo-
gisms. Law can only guide action if human beings are
rational creatures, capable of understanding and
conforming to legal requirements through intentional
action. Hence, it is assumed that human beings are
capable of at least a minimal form of rationality.
Morse indicates that the emphasis on rationality is so
strong that “some people who commit crimes under
the influence of mental disorder are excused from
responsibility because their rationality was compro-
mised, not because mental disorder played a causal
role in explaining the conduct” [52, p. 38]. According
to the Dutch Criminal Code, an individual cannot be
held responsible if he acted irrationally at the time he
committed a crime: “Not punishable is he who
commits a criminal act for which he cannot be held
responsible because of a defect of disorder of his
mental capacities” [53].
It is not improbable that DBS may in some cases
produce psychological changes leading to behavior that
is morally and legally questionable. Several cases in
which DBS has led to increased impulsivity and
aggressiveness [2, 50, 54], or inappropriate sexual
behavior [2], both of which could result in wrongful or
even criminal behavior, have been reported in the
literature. It is therefore questionable whether a patient
who received DBS should be held (completely)
responsible for his actions. It is currently unclear how
to deal with questions of responsibility if DBS changes
a patient’s cognitive or emotional states and these
changes cause undesirable or even deviant behavior.
We suggest that at this point much (though not
everything) can be learned from discussions
concerning responsibility for action in two distinct
fields. Firstly, an analogy to patients whose behavior
may have been influenced by medication can be
drawn. Most medications, especially those used to
treat serious disorders, have the potential for adverse
reactions. For instance, Levodopa, which is frequently
prescribed to PD patients, may cause “hedonistic
homeostatic dysregulation syndrome” resulting for
instance in inadequate impulse control [57], which
may in turn make the patient behave in a way that
causes damage. The overlap between DBS and
medication with regard to their potential for undesir-
able adverse reactions allows for a comparison of the
two conditions with regard to responsibility for
action. Secondly, an analogy can be drawn to patients
with Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID, also known
as Multiple Personality Disorder2). DID is a psychi-
atric disorder that is characterized by “the presence of
two or more distinct identities or personality states”
[58, p. 487]. These alters recurrently take control over
the person’s behavior with an associated memory loss
that goes beyond normal forgetfulness [58]. Although
the identity changes in DID are more dramatic and
appear to be more constant than personality changes
that might be caused by DBS, the fact that both
involve psychological discontinuities allows for a
comparison of the two conditions concerning ques-
tions of responsibility for action.
Responsibility for Action in Patients
under the Influence of Medication
Most medical treatments or interventions can have
unwanted side effects, some of which may even lead
to morally or legally questionable behavior. For
instance, it is well known that antidepressants can
have effects such as mania, agitation and akathisia,
which is an inner agitation that typically manifests
itself in the inability to stop moving and that has been
associated with increased aggressiveness [59–63].
These behavioral reactions can result in violence and
other forms of abnormal behavior, including abnormal
sexual behavior in some patients, especially in the
initial period of taking the medication [62]. In a case
described by Dorevitch et al., [62], a patient devel-
oped mania after taking fluvoxamine, a selective
serotonin reuptake inhibitor, resulting in inappropriate
behavior with sexual advances towards other patients.
Furthermore, there are several cases in which indi-
2 DBS induced changes in personal identity differ from DID,
mainly because the latter seems to be the most extreme form of
identity alterations and in DID, distinct identities exist in one
body at the same time. Additionally, DBS induced personality
changes are generally considered to be reversible, i.e. by
turning off the stimulation or changing its parameters, and
therefore more easily controllable. However, as noted above,
the effects of prolonged DBS use are still not very well known,
and that it is conceivable that this might lead to sustained
changes of personality and behavior, even after terminating
DBS. Also, we are aware of the controversy around DID [e.g.
55, 56], but this debate is beyond the scope of this paper.
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viduals without any prior history of aggressive or
violent behavior suddenly behaved violently after
taking antidepressants [59–61, 63, 64]. Several legal
cases linking violent behavior to the use of anti-
depressants have been reported [59–61]. For instance,
in 1998, a 65-year old man without any history of
violence or other serious disturbances was prescribed
an antidepressant by his general practitioner in order
to treat his anxiety and depressive episodes. Only
2 days after he had started taking the medication, he
murdered his wife, daughter and granddaughter
before killing himself. The pharmaceutical company
that marketed the antidepressant was sued by the son-
in-law and deemed 80% responsible for the events
since according to an expert witness the antidepres-
sant probably caused akathisia or psychosis which led
to the homicidal behavior [60].
Under the law, an individual can under certain
circumstances be declared not (fully) accountable for
his actions if he was intoxicated at the time of the
incident. It is important to note that there is a
difference between voluntary and involuntary intoxi-
cation; an individual is typically held criminally
responsible for behavior committed under the influ-
ence of alcohol or illegal drugs, because it is
presumed that he knew that the substance could
impair his ability to control his impulses and his
ability to make rational judgments. Hence, someone
who acted criminally or negligently while under the
influence of alcohol or illegal drugs is considered to
have acted intentionally and is held responsible for his
actions. Involuntary intoxication in contrast, which
can be caused by taking a prescription drug, can lead
to the verdict that an individual cannot be blamed for
his actions and is therefore not (fully) responsible
[65]. Hence, involuntary intoxication can be a
mitigating or exonerating factor in court, because the
suspect could not foresee the consequences of taking
the medication [65]. Although rather rare in the
Netherlands, these cases exist in legal practice. For
instance, in a decision of the court in Arnhem, the
offender—a man who had killed his wife by parking
their car on a railroad crossing—was judged to have
acted without intention because of a combination of
stress, sleep deprivation and the use of medication
prescribed for sleeplessness, leading to his acquittal
from murder charges [66]. In another case, a 64-year
old woman who had taken antidepressants and
murdered her husband and daughter before trying to
commit suicide was considered to have diminished
responsibility for her actions. The expert testimonies
concerning the impact of her depression and the
medication on her behavior were inconsistent, ranging
from slightly diminished responsibility to complete
absence of responsibility.3 She was ultimately con-
victed for murder, but received a reduced sentence
due to her diminished responsibility [67].
Since there are several similarities between DBS
and medication, considering how the legal system
deals with questions of responsibility for action if the
suspect’s personality and subsequent behavior were
influenced by involuntary intoxication can inform how
cases in which DBS induced personality changes
which may lead to violent behavior could be handled.
Both DBS and medication are intended to benefit the
individual. In both cases, deciding to cease treatment
because of unwanted side effects is difficult when there
is no alternative treatment. Nevertheless, disruptions in
psychological continuity and resulting aggressive or
impulsive behavior seem to warrant termination of
treatment. With regard to responsibility for action, the
question arises whether disruptions in psychological
continuity caused by DBS are similar to personality
changes caused by medication and should therefore be
considered involuntary intoxication.
Responsibility for Action in DID Patients
As Kennett and Matthews [68, p. 509–510; see also
72] formulate the problem succinctly: “if someone
with DID acts in a morally or legally bad way, can we
hold this individual responsible when it is claimed
that the accused personality is not the personality who
acted?” Regarding DID, it is of course possible to
claim that we are dealing either with one single
person having two alters, or with two different
persons. We suggest that the proper way, given the
pragmatic legal concerns, to deal with this question is
to invoke the PCPI. That is, if significant disconti-
nuities with respect to memories, intentions, beliefs,
goals, desires, and similarity of character are suffi-
cient to be considered as leading to a differentiation
3 A 5-point scale for responsibility (complete responsibility –
slightly diminished responsibility – diminished responsibility –
severely diminished responsibility – complete absence of
responsibility) is used in forensic practice in the Netherlands.
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between the (degrees of) rationality of the two alters,
then at least a serious consideration of the possibility
that we are dealing with two different persons is
warranted. Several researchers have argued that the
claim of DID patients that they are not responsible for
the actions of one of their alters should seriously be
considered [68–72].
A classic case mentioned by Kennett and Matthews
[68, p. 510] can be instructive here. It is the case of
Eve: Eve White was quite, demure, retiring, and
industrious. Her alter, Eve Black, was shrewd, rowdy,
and provocative. While White was unaware of Black,
Black knew about White and liked to cause her
discomfort (“When I go out and get drunk” (..) Eve
Black once said (..) “She wakes up with the hangover.
She wonders what in the hell’s made her so sick.”). It is
clear that in this case there is some form of psychological
discontinuity regardingmemory (though apparently only
one way4), that is directly related to the topic of
responsibility and punishment (albeit in a non-legal
way). Moreover, one may have good grounds to argue
that, as Kennett and Matthews [68, p. 511] formulate it,
“the patient does not possess the relevant capacities of
judgment and control” with respect to the actions
committed in an alter state. Hence, the discontinuity
arguably is affecting the rationality attribution to Eve
White regarding the actions of Eve Black.
Interestingly, judicial decisions in which the
suspect is acquitted of murder or manslaughter
because of a mental disorder are often (at least in
the Netherlands) based on a diagnosis of dissociative
disorder [73]. In order to provide some insight into
judicial decisions concerning the relation between
intent and mental disorder, Stevens and Prinsen [73]
analyzed manslaughter cases in the Netherlands in
which the presiding judge decided that the suspect
lacked intention because of a mental disorder [73].
This analysis revealed that in these cases, the suspect
was typically considered to have suffered from
dissociation at the time he committed the crime. To
give an example, a suspect who was accused of
having strangled his wife was diagnosed with an
acute dissociative disorder during the time of the
crime, i.e. his consciousness, memory, identity and
perception were disintegrated and he therefore lacked
cognitive control over his actions. This diagnosis was
accepted by the presiding judge as evidence for a lack
of intention on the basis of which the suspect was
acquitted and left the courtroom as a free man [73,
74]. Apparently, individuals who act in a state that is
dissociated from their real identity are often not held
criminally responsible for their actions.
It is possible to disagree with what would count as
a proper interpretation of cases in which an individual
with DID acts in a morally or legally irresponsible
way. In fact, Kennett and Matthews’ paper is a reply
to Sinnott-Armstrong and Behnke [72] who hold that,
at least in some cases, a person can be held morally
and legally responsible for actions committed by an
alter as long as the alter can be considered to possess
the capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of a
particular conduct or conform his conduct to the
requirements of the law [72].
The issue here is not whether we agree with one of
the viewpoints only briefly discussed above. Rather,
the question that we raise here is whether there is
reason to believe that DBS can lead to legally relevant
discontinuity type of phenomena regarding memories,
intentions, beliefs, goals, desires, and similarity of
character between the patient in ‘DBS-on’ and ‘DBS-
off’ conditions. Moreover, could these discontinuities
be so severe that similar (not necessarily exactly the
same) kinds of debates about personal responsibility
as in the case of DID are justified? If someone who
has received DBS acts in a morally or legally bad
way, can we hold this individual responsible when it
is claimed that the person who acted is not the same
person as before the treatment? Current review papers
[75, 76] indicate that the jury is still out on the effects
of DBS on personal identity. Several case studies
however suggest that DBS can induce rather large
changes in psychological continuity [15, 51]. An
illustrative case in this regard is that of a 65-year-old
woman who received DBS in order to treat her PD
and who experienced “a remarkable mood change”
[51, p. 1383]. The patient became euphoric and started
to talk excessively. As the physicians report, “she lost
normal social inhibitions, was in love with two
neurologists, and tried to embrace and kiss people. She
4 There is a distinction between knowing or remembering that I
drank or had a headache and knowing or remembering the
drinking or having the headache. From the description, it
appears that Eve Black has (access to) both regarding the
drinking and the first, declarative, but not the second, episodic
type of memory regarding the headache. Eve White appears to
have (access to) neither the declarative nor the episodic
knowledge or memory of the drinking, but does have both for
the headache.
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was hyperactive and restless, she left the clinic several
times without permission and engaged in unrestrained
buying of clothing.” [51, p. 1383]. In addition, she
developed psychotic symptoms, suspecting her sons of
conspiring against her, and became hostile. Although
the patient in this case did not develop an alternate
identity, the changes in her personality, i.e. mania and
psychotic symptoms, are so severe that one may speak
of disruptions in psychological continuity. It is difficult
to determine responsibility for action if these disrup-
tions in psychological continuity lead to wrongful or
even criminal behavior. Based on the literature on the
responsibility of DID patients, it can be argued that if
normally integrated functions of memory, intentions,
beliefs, goals, desires, and similarity of character of a
patient are disrupted as a result of the DBS treatment, it
is not intuitively clear that he should be held
(completely) responsible for his actions.
Psychological Continuity and Mental Competence
If DBS affects psychological continuity, then this might
influence a person’s mental competence, i.e. the ability
to remember and understand relevant information and to
make a decision on the basis of this information [32]. In
turn, this might affect, or even lead to the loss of the
ability to make reasonable decisions about the contin-
uation of the treatment. Hence, although DBS can
extend a patient’s freedom considerably—enabling him
to live a life independent from constant care—it may at
the same time affect the patient’s decisional capacity
and hence his autonomy. In cases in which DBS has a
substantial effect on psychological continuity, it may
be necessary to determine whether the patient can
make a decision about the continuation of his treatment
or whether the decision should be made by a legal
representative and the medical team.
As pointed out by Glannon [77], the loss of
decisional capacity in cases in which DBS has caused
substantial personality alterations can be viewed as
different in several ways from the typical case of
advance directives in which a patient has to make a
decision about the continuation of treatment at a later
stage of the illness when he may no longer be competent
to make well-informed decisions. In contrast to many
other disorders, for instance Alzheimer’s disease, the
loss of decisional capacity in DBS patients may not be
gradual, but can occur rapidly, or even immediately after
turning stimulation on. An additional difference between
DBS and most other disorders concerns the reversibility
of the condition. Although complete reversibility may be
questionable, at least in some cases, if DBS is turned off,
mental competence can be regained.
The problem of mental competence in patients who
receive DBS and experience disruptions in psycholog-
ical continuity is even more complex, since granting the
patient his autonomy with regard to the decision about
the continuation of treatment, raises a new question; if
the patient makes an autonomous decision, in which
state should he make it, when stimulation is turned on or
when it is turned off? This problem is best illustrated by
a case study discussed by Leentjens and colleagues [23].
A 62-year-old PD patient developed a manic disorder
after receiving DBS. The stimulation had caused
serious personality changes including chaotic behavior,
megalomania and mental incompetence. In this state,
the patient did not suffer from motor impairments, but
due to his impaired psychiatric functioning he was
considered unable to live on his own. When DBS was
turned off, his insight and capacity to judge returned.
Since the psychiatric symptoms could not be treated
medically, and without DBS the patient’s motor
symptoms exacerbated, it was decided to either disable
DBS and admit the patient to a nursing home because
of severe motor impairment, or to continue DBS and
admit him to a psychiatric institution because of severe
mental impairment [23].
This decision however entailed three important
problems. Firstly, the medical team needed to deter-
mine in which state the patient should be asked about
whether or not to continue the treatment; either when
stimulation was on and mental capacity was impaired,
or when stimulation was turned off and mental
capacity was unimpaired. Following the advice of
the hospital’s ethical commission, it was eventually
decided to ask the patient when stimulation was
turned off, so that he could decide in a mentally
competent state [23; see also 78], and he decided that
he wanted to continue with DBS and consequently be
admitted to a psychiatric institution.
The second problem concerned the implementation
of this decision [23]. According to Dutch health law,
judicial authorization in a psychiatric hospital is only
possible if the harm cannot be averted by interference
of a person or institution [79, article 2]. Additionally,
a treatment plan focusing on removing the harm that
is responsible for the patient’s hospitalization is
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required by law [79, article 38]. The harm, i.e. the
patient’s altered personality and the behavior resulting
from this alteration, could have been averted or
removed by turning off the DBS. Hence, none of
these legal requirements was fulfilled. This ascertain-
ment suggests that current regulation does not
sufficiently cover issues that are raised by treatment
with new technologies such as DBS.
The third problem brings us back to the initial
problem. Since DBS already influenced the patient’s
personality considerably (at least when stimulation
was turned on), it is possible that continuation of the
treatment will ultimately result in permanent and
potentially even irreversible changes in the patient’s
personality. The difficulty arising from this is whether
and to what degree the patient can be considered to be
able to foresee the possible consequences of the
treatment and the effect this has on his identity.
Moreover, this raises the question whether the treating
physicians or a legal representative should interfere in
the decision or be able to cancel the treatment at a
later point in time in order to protect the patient from
any (further) changes to his identity, which could
undermine the patient’s autonomy [23]. As this case
shows, DBS can in some cases interfere with the
patient’s mental competence, which can render the
patient unable to make a reasonable decision about the
continuation of the treatment. It is therefore important
to not only develop guidelines that will help treating
physicians to make decisions in these cases, but
moreover to adjust current legal rules to capture issues
raised by new technologies such as DBS.
Conclusion and Questions for Further Research
The increasing use of DBS will lead to a vigorous
debate about the personality and personal identity of
patients receiving DBS, especially in relation to
assessments of their responsibility for action and
capacity to make decisions. As described above, the
application of DBS is currently accompanied by a
lack of clarity concerning questions of responsibility
for action and mental competence. By comparing
personality changes induced by DBS to personality
changes induced by medication, as well as by
comparing disruptions in psychological continuity in
DBS patients to disruptions in psychological continu-
ity in DID patients, we attempt to stimulate the
discussion of responsibility for action in DBS
patients. Both medication and DID are similar to the
effects of DBS in some regards and this suggests that
questions about legal responsibility could be solved in
similar ways. An analysis would certainly benefit
from thorough legal research on this matter.
It is important to note that the question of
responsibility is broader than described here. For
instance, termination of treatment, e.g. induced by
battery failure, might also cause undesirable—al-
though probably not criminal—behavior. Battery
failure could cause the patient to relapse into a state
quite similar to the one before treatment which may
result in damage. In addition, it can lead to undesir-
able behavior in individuals who were depressive
before DBS treatment and suffered from suicidal
thoughts. These issues raise questions concerning
civil liability, e.g. the liability of physicians or manu-
facturers of DBS apparatus in relation to information
duties regarding the patient. Both treatment and termi-
nation of treatment raise questions concerning criminal
responsibility and civil liability. While we have limited
ourselves to discussing responsibility for action in a
criminal law context, there is an urgent need to deal with
both questions concerning criminal responsibility and
civil liability in cases in which either DBS treatment or
termination of DBS treatment results in undesirable
behavior and damage.
A similar conclusion can be drawn with regard to
mental competence. There is currently a lack of clarity
concerning certain health law aspects. Specifically, it is
unclear how to deal with patients who, due to DBS,
experience an alteration in their personality to such a
degree that it affects their ability to make reasonable
decisions about the continuation of treatment. For
treating physicians it is necessary to know how to deal
with these patients. Furthermore, it seems obvious that
there is a need for adaption of current legal rules in order
to account for patients with DBS (and other neuro-
technological interventions). As described above, cur-
rent regulation—at least in the Netherlands and
presumably in most countries—is insufficient when
dealing with DBS patients who are due to the treatment
no longer capable of at least minimally rational
decision-making. So far, none of the legal questions
raised by DBS have received sufficient debate.
On a more general level, it will be necessary to
address questions concerning the effect of DBS on
patients’ personality; not only whether these changes
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are harmful but more importantly, under what circum-
stances they might be harmful or undesirable. Per-
sonality changes may, at least in some cases, be the
intended outcome in psychiatric patients rather than
an unwanted side effect. Consequently, the question
should be how much change in an individual’s
personal identity is acceptable and under what
circumstances this is acceptable. Additionally, the
consequences of these changes as well as their ethical
and legal implications need further discussion. It
bears emphasis that these issues can and will be
addressed by different parties, viz. by (1) the patient
him/herself, (2) significant others, (3) the involved
scientific and clinical teams, and (4) society at large
(e.g. law and public opinion). It is not to be expected
that all four parties will agree on similar answers to all
questions, even regarding the same case.
Moreover, the questions themselves are complex
and diverse, and at this stage still in need of being
formulated properly. Some of the most significant
questions include, but are definitely not confined to,
the following: How well do traditional concepts about
personality and identity apply to patients receiving
DBS who have undergone significant, at times quite
rapid, and not always entirely foreseeable changes?
Does the treatment amount to, or could it be
conceptualized as, the person (temporarily) being
cured, restored, complemented or changed? What
influence does the possibility of a relatively quick
reversal of these changes (through switching DBS off)
play regarding the (un)acceptability of a particular
interpretation? How reversible are personality
changes induced by DBS? Could there be systematic
differences regarding this conceptualization between
the different people involved, i.e. the patient, the
medical team, significant others, the family, friends,
colleagues, neighbors? How do these changes and the
way they can be conceptualized affect the person’s
(re-)adjustment to society, e.g. influence the roles they
play within the contexts of relations, family, profes-
sion and society at large? What effect does the
dependency on technology have on personal identity?
Considering that with advancements in the tech-
nology and due to its successfulness DBS will most
likely be expanded to various clinical populations,
questions concerning the effect of DBS on an
individual’s personality and personal identity as well
as the ethical and legal consequences thereof need
much closer attention. Research addressing these
questions would not just benefit from but requires a
multidisciplinary approach.
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